Organizational decisions in multistage production processes are often not made by the downstream headquarter firm, but by the various intermediate inputs suppliers along the value chain themselves. We assume a production process with one headquarter (final good producer) and two suppliers at...

Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass die Festlegung der Fertigungstiefe in der Gegenstromplanung von Strategien kein stringentes Instrument der Unternehmensführung ist. Die Top-Down und Bottom-Up Analyse über die hierarchischen Ebenen der Unternehmens-, Wettbewerbs- und Funktionalstrategie...

In the German automobile industry the vertical integration, as an indicator of value added, is on average low. Beyond the argument of relative high labour costs for manufacturing, several specific reasons for the level of vertical integration, linked to the flexibility of business administration...

Economic theory provides various explanations for vertical integration but transaction costs seem to be a major determinant of backward, forward and lateral integration. The paper studies integration trends in the newly emerging Bulgarian pharmaceutical sector, seeking transaction cost...

Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass die Festlegung der Fertigungstiefe in der Gegenstromplanung von Strategien kein stringentes Instrument der Unternehmensführung ist. Die Top-Down und Bottom-Up Analyse über die hierarchischen Ebenen der Unternehmens-, Wettbewerbs- und Funktionalstrategie...

Organizational decisions in multistage production processes are often not made by the downstream headquarter firm, but by the various intermediate inputs suppliers along the value chain themselves. We assume a production process with one headquarter (final good producer) and two suppliers at...

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party...

The effect of property rights allocation on characteristics of the vertically integrated company and properties of the corresponding market equilibria are studied. It is shown that partial integration can induce inefficient super-monopolistic market equilibria and unbalance in the functioning of...

I provide a justification of intellectual property rights as a source of static efficiency gains in manufacturing, rather than dynamic benefits from greater innovation. I develop a property-rights model of a supply relationship with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium,...

The holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts, but they share certain fundamental similarities that have not generally been recognized. In particular, both involve activities requiring an up-front, non-salvageable investment, and both require the investor to purchase an input, the...