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Electoral thresholds and political outcomes: Quasi-experimental evidence from a reform in Germany
Baskaran, Thushyanthan; Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana - 2013
In 2001, the state parliament of the German federal state of Hesse abolished a 5 percent legal electoral threshold for local elections. This reform had a stronger effect on municipalities with larger councils because implicit electoral thresholds decrease with council size. Exploiting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327571
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The Buchanan-Tullock Model: Some Extensions
Kafoglis, Milton; Cebula, Richard - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1980
In their seminal work, The Calculus of Consent (1962), Buchanan and Tullock develop a decision model which embodies fundamental relation­ships relevant to institutional choices. However, the Buchanan-Tullock model remains "general," thus inviting others to specify details and to develop...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257880
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Electoral thresholds and political outcomes: Quasi-experimental evidence from a reform in Germany
Baskaran, Thushyanthan; Fonseca, Mariana Lopes da - Center for European, Governance and Economic … - 2013
In 2001, the state parliament of the German federal state of Hesse abolished a 5 percent legal electoral threshold for local elections. This reform had a stronger effect on municipalities with larger councils because implicit electoral thresholds decrease with council size. Exploiting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010954309
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Electoral thresholds and political outcomes: quasi-experimental evidence from a reform in Germany
Baskaran, Thushyanthan; Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana - 2013
In 2001, the state parliament of the German federal state of Hesse abolished a 5 percent legal electoral threshold for local elections. This reform had a stronger effect on municipalities with larger councils because implicit electoral thresholds decrease with council size. Exploiting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010213030
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Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets
Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084259
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Lobbying in a multidimensional policy space with salient issues
Roberti, Paolo - 2014
We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some issues more salient than others. We find that special interest groups that lobby on less salient topics move the implemented policy closer to their preferred policy, compared to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729170
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Citizens or lobbies : who controls policy?
Roberti, Paolo - 2016
This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased in favor of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703380
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - 2015
ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282471
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272198
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - 2015 - Revised version, April 2015
ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243444