The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem under the aegis of an uninformed mediator. This paper focuses on institutional contexts without such mediator. Contributors privately informed on their willingness to pay...

We study monopolistic design of a menu of non-linear tariffs when consumers have biased prior beliefs regarding their future preferences. In our model, consumers are "optimistic'' if their prior belief assigns too much weight to states of nature characterized by large gains from trade. A...

In this paper, based on the incomplete contract perspective, we select the implementation of the Electronic Commerce Law of the People's Republic of China as a quasi-natural experiment to study the tax compliance incentive effects of platform firms. Our study finds that the Chinese experience...

Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...

This study analyzes small-sized asset owners' optimal choice problems in selecting an outsourced chief investment officer (OCIO). While large-sized asset owners can select OCIOs through procurement auctions, it is difficult for small-sized asset owners to use this method. Instead, they access...