This paper introduces a new information density indicator to provide a more comprehensive understanding of price … reactions to news and, more specifically, to the sources of jumps in financial markets. Our information density indicator, which …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

subject to a private information problem. The asset plays the role of a medium of exchange, but this role can be affected by … information, a set of experiments with adverse selection where the terminal value of notes are determined exogenously, and a set …

private information. This suggests that economists' inability to explain asset price movements is the result of either noise …

information in the form of environmental, social and governance (ESG) data. However, progress is contingent on collecting evidence …-identified sustainability information have higher stock price informativeness. In contrast, sustainability disclosures not identified as …-industry information transfers to firms with low SASB-identified sustainability disclosure in industries where firms have higher SASB …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …