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this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change - but only when the team is sufficiently homogenous …. Indeed, we find substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance (only) in homogenous teams. Moreover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009630660
heterogeneity and correct for stock-sampling. We find a positive effect of mixed-aged team work on employment duration and a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657522
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754882
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. Betrachtet man die innerbetriebliche Organisation aus der Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik, so kann man die Arbeitsgruppe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411234
This paper assesses the role of distance in professional team sports, taking the example of football (soccer). We argue … that a team’s performance in terms of scored and conceded goals decreases with the distance to the foreign playing venue … Deutsche Bundesliga’) between the playing seasons 1986-87 and 2006-07. We find that distance increases a guest team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009732571
Kooperation ist ein unverzichtbarer Leistungsbestandteil. Nur durch kooperatives Verhalten gelingt die Abstimmung der Arbeitstätigkeiten, ohne Kooperation gibt es keinen Informationsaustausch, keine Unterstützung und keine Hilfe, sondern allenfalls eine Menge unfruchtbarer Konflikte....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722272
importance of individual, team, and company performance for compensation, we find a significant positive relation between the … intensity of team incentives and several survey measures of cooperation. Moreover, higher powered team incentives are associated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009235552
Using data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, we find that the use of self-managed teams is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003652704
Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003577782