We propose a notion of r-rationality, a relative version of satisficing behavior based on the idea that, for any set of available alternatives, individuals choose one of their r-best according to a single preference. We fully characterize the choice functions satisfying the condition for any r,...

We consider collective decision problems where some agents have private information about alternatives and others don't. Voting takes place under strategy-proof rules. Prior to voting, informed agents may or may not disclose their private information, thus eventually influencing the preferences...

This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models.

The main purpose of the Handbook of Utility Theory is to make more widely available some recent developments in the area. The editors selected a list of topics that seemed ripe enough to be covered by review articles. Then they invited contributions from researchers whose expert work had come to...

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individual in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the...