Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies.The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts...

In this paper we study competitve outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game....

In this paper a survey is presented of works on market demand. Conditions are examined under which such demand is a continuous function of prices and conditions which ensure its continuous differentiability.

Im Mittelpunkt der auf WALRAS (1874) zurückgehenden allgemeinen Gleichgewichtstheorie steht der Begriff des Wettbewerbsgleichgewichts. Diesem nicht kooperativen Gleichgewichtsbegriff lässt sich ein anderer, kooperativer gegenüberstellen, der auf EDGEWORTH (1881) zurückgeht, der des Kerns...

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...