This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on...

A linear utility representation theorem due to Blackwell and Girshick (1953) is used to answer the question as formulated by Grandmont (1987) whether Cobb-Douglas representable preferences are the only ones which are budget-invariant.

The paper presents an alternative short proof for the linear utility representation theorem. In particular a generalization of the theorem of Blackwell and Girshick (1954) and a special case of the theorem of Herstein and Milnor (1953) are proved by exploiting the topological group structure of...

Consider a topological space T which is the union of a family of G-orbits, where G is a locally euclidean group G acting on T. On every G-orbit consider a probability which is absolutely continuous with respect to the image measure of the normalized restriction of the Haar measure on some...

This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on...

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G(S,d) is defined that has an infinity of weakly...