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Does hidden information make trade liberalization more fragile?

Herzing, Mathias - In: The Canadian journal of economics 44 (2011) 2, pp. 561-579

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009384074

Does hidden information make trade liberalization more fragile?

Herzing, Mathias - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003978768

Experiments on cooperation and markets with asymmetric information

Angelova, Vera - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008842069

Essays on strategic incentives for information revelation

Serrano-Padial, Ricardo - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689759

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852

Asymmetric forecast information and the value of demand observation in repeated procurement

Shamir, Noam - In: Decision sciences : DS 44 (2013) 6, pp. 979-1020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010245455

Self-enforcing price leadership

Gudino, Gustavo - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-18

A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and are identical except for the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607377

Chapter 6 Arms races and proliferation

Brito, Dagobert L.; Intriligator, Michael D. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 1, (pp. 109-164). 1995

behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations …, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and nuclear proliferation. Recent developments in economic theory are also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024425

Reputation building under uncertain monitoring

Deb, Joyee; Ishii, Yuhta - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 1, pp. 169-208

We study the standard reputation model with a long-run (LR) player facing a sequence of short-run (SR) opponents, with one difference: the SR players are uncertain about the monitoring structure, while the LR player knows it. We construct examples where the standard reputation result breaks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015332592