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Ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of contractual form

Mukerji, Sujoy - 1997 - Rev. ed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645679

Ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of contractual form

Mukerji, Sujoy - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000584389

Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form

Mukerji, Sujoy - 2001

contracts. The setting for the demonstration is the investment hold-up model which has been the focus of much of the recent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060370

Investments and risk transfers

Baldenius, Tim; Michaeli, Beatrice - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 92 (2017) 6, pp. 1-23

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011780668

Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts

Malcomson, James M. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012596563

Competition through endogenized tournaments : an interpretation of "face-to-face" competition

Konishi, Hideki - In: Journal of the Japanese and international economies : … 10 (1996) 3, pp. 199-232

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001210255

Strategic delegation, stock options, and investment hold-up problems

Yoon, Dae-Hee - In: Accounting, organizations and society : an … 71 (2018), pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011955506

Patents as Incomplete Contracts : Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art

Kesan, Jay P.; Banik, Marc - 2001

In high technology areas such as biotechnology and computer software, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is poorly informed about the relevant prior art. In these cases, it may be optimal for the PTO to provide incentives to the patentee to produce a complete prior art disclosure. Such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014133978

Risk, delegation, and project scope

Roider, Andreas (contributor) - 2007

exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal … may prefer to delegate authority over decisions to the risk-averse agent. Intuitively, for incentive reasons, the … principal may optimally want to allow the agent to reduce his risk exposure. Nevertheless, even endogenous risk may be higher …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003566282

Contracting on credit ratings : adding value to public information

Parlour, Christine A.; Rajan, Uday - In: The review of financial studies 33 (2020) 4, pp. 1412-1444

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012198375