This paper constructs a macro-finance model with two types of borrowers: entrepreneurs who engage in productive activities and gamblers who play in lotteries. It links a central bank's interest rate policy to expected cash flows of both types of borrowers. Via this link we study how the...

Deliberately or not, by providing its stance on the prospects of the economy, rationalizing past decisions or announcing future actions, central banks influence financial markets' expectations of its future policy. In bad times, monetary policy communication inducing an upward revision of the...

Bailout expectations have led banks to behave imprudently, holding too little capital and relying too much on short term funding to finance long term investments. This paper presents a model to rationalize a constructive ambiguity approach to liquidity assistance as a solution to forbearance....

Recent cross-country studies on the globalization and output-inflation tradeoff correlation find openness has no significant effect on OECD countries. Those studies assume parameter constancy across countries. In this paper, we argue that this assumption does not hold for major industrialized...

Banking regulation has proven to be inadequate to guard systemic stability in the recent financial crisis. Central banks have provided liquidity and ministries of finance have set up rescue programmes to restore confidence and stability. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity...

We analyze revealed policy preferences in monetary policy committees. From the voting records of the Bank of England we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We analyze systematic patterns in these policy preferences. We nd that internal committee members tend to hold...

This paper analyzes the impact of a liquidity requirement similar to the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) on the unsecured interbank money market and therefore on the implementation of monetary policy. Combining two unique datasets of Dutch banks from 2005 to 2011, we show that banks which...