We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H...

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross-listed firms' compliance with SOX-mandated internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross-listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting...

Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for...

We propose and validate a comprehensive measure of power for the top management teams (TMTs) of publicly listed Chinese firms. We show that our measure is positively associated with the four power dimensions developed by prior research for U.S. firms as well as three Asia-relevant power...

Using a proprietary database of institutional investors' daily stock trading records in the post-Regulation FD period, this study examines whether transient institutions have the independent ability to correctly process small negative earnings surprise announcements, which management claims...

Evidence contrasting U.S. insider trades in high- and low-jeopardy periods and across firms at high and low risk for 10b-5 litigation indicates that insiders condition their trades on foreknowledge of price-relevant public disclosures, but avoid profitable trades when the jeopardy associated...

We provide evidence that transient institutional investors (i.e., those actively trading to maximize short term profits) trade to exploit the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We estimate that transient institutions' arbitrage generates an abnormal return of 5.1 percent (or 22 percent...

We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H...

We examine the determinants and consequences of stock option compensation to directors of state-controlled Chinese firms that are incorporated outside China and listed in Hong Kong, referred to as state-controlled Red Chip firms, over the period 1990-2005. We find that state-controlled Red Chip...