Global games of regime change -- that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it -- have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...

When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit strategic complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, then they want to know what others know. Likewise, strategic substitutability in actions produces strategic...

Global games of regime change-coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it-have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the...

I study a search economy in which intermediaries are the driving force co-ordinating the economy on the use of a unique, common medium of exchange for transactions. If search frictions delay trade, intermediaries offering immediate exchange opportunities can make arbitrage gains from a price...