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Kaplan, Todd R.; Ruffle, Bradley J. - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 122 (2012) 563, pp. 1042-1068

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009713420

A simple economic teaching experiment on the hold-up problem

Balkenborg, Dieter; Kaplan, Todd R.; Miller, Timothy - In: The journal of economic education 43 (2012) 4, pp. 377-385

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009714165

Advances in auctions

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shemuʾel - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347867

Advances in auctions

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shemuʾel - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343539

Explaining behavior in the "11-20" game

Choo, Lawrence C. Y.; Kaplan, Todd R. - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343546

Influence of aggregation and measurement scale on ranking a compromise alternative in AHP

Ishizaka, Alessio; Balkenborg, Dieter; Kaplan, Todd R. - In: Journal of the Operational Research Society : OR 62 (2011) 4, pp. 700-710

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008987967

Vote or shout

Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R. - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 10 (2010) 1, pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545018

Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions : analytic solutions to the general case

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 50 (2012) 2, pp. 269-302

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009547238

Teaching bank runs with classroom experiments

Balkenborg, Dieter; Kaplan, Todd R.; Miller, Timothy - In: The journal of economic education 42 (2011) 3, pp. 224-242

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009270527

Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation

Fischer, Sven Heiko; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; … - 2014 - This version: November 5, 2014

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433909