We show for a widely-used class of models for strategic R&D that optimally subsidizing cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of private R&D investments. We then highlight the limitations of the framework that are responsible for this finding and conclude that policy...

Using a comprehensive international trade data set we document empirical Power Laws (PLs) for the distribution of the interaction between countries as measured by revealed comparative advantage. Using the recently developed estimator by Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), we find strong evidence in...

The authors describe a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student "sellers" first make investment decisions and then production decisions. The...

We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. A firm has monopoly power in one market but faces competition by a second firm in another market. We compare treatments where the monopolist can bundle its two products to treatments where it cannot, and we contrast simultaneous...

P-p plots contain all the information that is needed for scale-invariant comparisons. Indeed, Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) tests translate sample p-p plots into a single number. In this paper we characterize the set of all distinct p-p plots for two balanced sample of size <I>n</I> absent...</i>

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

We propose a quantification of the p-p plot that assigns equal weight to all distances between the respective distributions: the surface between the p-p plot and the diagonal. This surface is labeled the Harmonic Weighted Mass (HWM) index. We introduce the diagonal-deviation (d-d) plot that...

The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustain a collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium given subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc- cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance...