Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm's economic and informational environment is independent of the governance structure. The model assumes that wage contracts between the firm's owner (government or private entrepreneur)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597691

Start-up firms, venture capital financing, and renegotiation

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001444202

Central governance or subsidiarity : a property-rights approach to federalism

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001444203

The hold-up problem in government contracting

Bös, Dieter - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000910409

Incomplete contracts and renegotiation in long-term trade relationships

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000952092

Bilateral bargaining under non-verifiable information

Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993129

Partial monitoring, managerial compensation, and the internal efficiency of the firm

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993238

Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice

Kessler, Anke S. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993339

Hold-up problem in government contracting

Bös, Dieter - In: Journal of financial management and analysis : … 9 (1996) 1, pp. 21-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001213631

The hold-up problem in government contracting

Bös, Dieter - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 98 (1996) 1, pp. 53-74

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001198378

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