We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that...

A home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm's country. Credible signaling to deter counter-entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports), and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits,...

We define a supervised market mechanism to deal with the airport slot allocation problem. This mechanism is based on the principles underlying the AIP model for regulation of radio spectrum. Incentive prices for airport slots should reflect an estimate of the marginal value of each slot to end...

We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that...

National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are...

We analyze the impact of access price regulation on the entrants' investment in network quality. We consider a dynamic framework where developing an alternative infrastructure requires both time and a captive customer base. We show that a multi-period schedule where regulated access charges rise...