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Information, Rationality and Aggregation of Competences : Condorcet's Jury Theorem (Information, Rationalite et Agregation des Competences: Le Theoreme du Jury de Condorcet)

Lepoder, Laurence; Sebagh, Thierry - 2009

presenting the initial formulation of the jury theorem, we shall show that collective competence arises even if individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216767

Learning juror competence : a generalized condorcet jury theorem

Romeijn, Jan-Willem; Atkinson, David - In: Politics, philosophy & economics : ppe 10 (2011) 3, pp. 237-262

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009233102

Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem

McCannon, Bryan; Walker, Paul - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523365

Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem

McCannon, Bryan; Walker, Paul - In: Public choice 169 (2016) 1/2, pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659292

Variable competence and collective performance : unanimity versus simple majority rule

Baharad, Eyal; Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Group decision and negotiation 29 (2020) 1, pp. 157-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012225121

Convention decisions and voting records

Bain, Richard C. - 1960

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001395180

Congressmen's voting decisions

Kingdon, John W. - 1973

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000669240

Voting over efficient decision rules in budget-balanced organizations

Hueth, Brent; Melkonyan, Tigran A. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 51 (2003) 2, pp. 279-301

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001765422

Manipulation of non-imposed, non-oligarchic, non-binary group decision rules

Bandyopadhyay, Taradas - In: Economics letters 11 (1983) 1/2, pp. 69-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001867589

When Does Approval Voting Make the 'Right Choices'?

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2011

We assume that a voter’s judgment about a proposal depends on (i) the proposal’s probability of being right (or good or just) and (ii) the voter’s probability of making a correct judgment about its rightness (or wrongness). Initially, the state of a proposal (right or wrong), and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042385