What is the meaning of "majoritarianism" as a principle of democratic group decision-making in a judgement aggregation problem, when the propositionwise majority view is logically inconsistent? We argue that the majoritarian ideal is best embodied by the principle of "supermajority efficiency"...

We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of...

Suppose in each equation, not counting covariance restrictions, we need one more restriction to meet the order condition. If we now add to each equation a restriction that its structural residual is uncorrelated with the residual of some other equation, is the parameter of the new model...

In this paper, we study preferences over Savage acts that map states to opportunity sets. Conditional preferences over opportunity sets may be inconsistent with indirect-utility maximization due to implicit uncertainty about future preferences (preference for flexibility), or to an intrinsic...

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice under uncertainty for decision-makers whose preferences are exhaustively described by partial orders representing ""limited information."" Specifically, we consider the limiting case of ""Complete Ignorance"" decision problems characterized...

This paper raises the problem of how to define revealed probabilistic beliefs in the context of the capacity/Choquet Expected Utility model. At the center of the analysis is a decision-theoretically axiomatized definition of ""revealed unambiguous events."" The definition is shown to impose...

The central result of this paper establishes an isomorphism between two types of mathematical structures: ""ternary preorders"" and ""convex topologies."" The former are characterized by reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity conditions, and can be interpreted geometrically as ordered...

Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two ""like minded"" individuals cannot ""agree to disagree"" in the following sense. If they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (using Bayes'' rule) on the basis of private...

We provide an introduction to interactive belief systems from a qualitative and semantic point of view. Properties of belief hierarchies are formulated locally. Among the properties considered are ""Common belief in no error"" (which has been shown to have important game theoretic applications),...

We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried...