We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of...

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a...

Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two ""like minded"" individuals cannot ""agree to disagree"" in the following sense. If they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (using Bayes'' rule) on the basis of private...

This paper raises the problem of how to define revealed probabilistic beliefs in the context of the capacity/Choquet Expected Utility model. At the center of the analysis is a decision-theoretically axiomatized definition of ""revealed unambiguous events."" The definition is shown to impose...

Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals'' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two...

The main result of this paper characterizes possibly non-symmetric strategy-proof and efficienct choice functions as Perfectly Competitive. Efficiency is defined as impossibility of improvement by reallocation of commodity among finite sets of agents, and largeness of the economy is captured by...