Traditional location literature concludes that firms will optimally differentiate in order to alleviate a tendency toward competitive pricing. However, it has recently been shown that firms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly) anticipate an absence of price competition. This paper...

Strategic pricing is an important and exciting topic in industrial organization and the economics of strategy. A wide range of texts use what has become a standard version of the Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) limit-pricing model to convey the essential ideas of strategic pricing under incomplete...

This article describes a repeated game of multimarket contact, designed to be played throughout an entire term. Besides enjoying reciprocal advantages in their home markets, firms are perfectly informed after every round about each other's decisions. For most of the game, it appears there is...

This article refines an established explanation of how multimarket contact facilitates collusion when firms enjoy reciprocal advantages across markets: When there are reciprocal asymmetries between firms, multimarket contact allows them not only to develop spheres of influence, but also to...