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On the convergence of logit equilibrium in order statistic games

Yi, Kang-oh - In: The Korean economic review 22 (2006) 1, pp. 69-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009934535

Logit solution and equilibrium selection in two-person games

Yi, Kang-oh - In: The Korean economic review 50 (2009) 2, pp. 289-298

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009934595

Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game

Yi, Kang-Oh - In: Games and economic behavior 51 (2005) 2, pp. 324-348

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002940019

Logit solution and equilibrium selection in two-person games

Yi, Kang-oh - In: The Korean economic review 50 (2009) 2, pp. 289-298

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003926820

Payoff-dependent mistakes and q-resistant equilibrium

Yi, Kang-oh - In: Economics letters 102 (2009) 2, pp. 99-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003818362

On the convergence of logit equilibrium in order statistic games

Yi, Kang-oh - In: The Korean economic review 22 (2006) 1, pp. 69-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003738725

Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game

Yi, Kang-Oh - In: Games and Economic Behavior 51 (2005) 2, pp. 324-348

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413447

A quantal response equilibrium model of order-statistic games

Yi, Kang-Oh - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 51 (2003) 3, pp. 413

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006822692

A quantal response equilibrium model of order-statistic games

Yi, Kang-Oh - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51 (2003) 3, pp. 413-425

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005127138

Payoff-dependent mistakes and q-resistant equilibrium

Yi, Kang-Oh - In: Economics Letters 102 (2009) 2, pp. 99-101

This paper proposes an extension of p-dominance called q-resistant equilibrium, which has the largest resistance to payoff-dependent mistakes. The selection could differ from the risk-dominant equilibrium, and a sufficient condition for a q-resistant equilibrium to follow risk-dominance is provided.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005288166