Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games. The...

In this paper, we introduce a general framework for situations with decision making under uncertainty and cooperation possibilities. This framework is based upon a two stage stochastic programming approach. We show that under relatively mild assumptions the cooperative games associated with...

In this paper we study information sharing situations. For every information sharing situation we construct an associated cooperative game, which we call an information sharing game. We show that the class of information sharing games co-incides with the class of cooperative games with a...

A vector of balanced weights infers an inequality that games with a nonempty core obey. This paper gives a generalization of the notion 'vector of balanced weights'. Herewith it provides necessary and su?cient conditions to determine whether a TU-game has a population monotonic allocation scheme...

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We show that with at most five players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the...

An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects. A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley...

We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967). First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse situations where the fuzzy game is continuous. Our main result shows...