We introduce the class of Obligation Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situations. The main result of this paper is that such rules are cost monotonic and induce also population monotonic allocation schemes. Another characteristic of Obligation Rules is that they assign to a minimum cost...

The analysis of single-valued solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utilities has a long tradition. Opposed to most of this literature we will not deal with solution concepts that provide payoffs to the players for the grand coalition only, but we will analyze allocation...

Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining liabilities with different sensitivities focuses on the optimal liability mix, but does not address the question whether and how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. In the absence of a well-functioning...

In this paper two cost sharing solutions for minimum cost spanning tree problems are introduced, the degree adjusted folk solution and the cost adjusted folk solution. These solutions overcome the problem of the classical reductionist folk solution as they have considerable strict ranking power,...

Finite potential games are determined, i.e. have Nash-equilibria in pure strategies.In this paper we investigate the determinateness of potential games, in which one or more players have infinitely many pure strategies

This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, once the countries concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement through a Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO). Proposing the population monotonic allocation scheme as...