Seminal work in finance, economics, and psychology has documented that individuals tell the truth more often than standard economic models predict. But researchers have so far only indirectly inferred a preference for truth-telling from agents’ observed behavior. Using experiments, we explore...

Recent organizational theories suggest that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence. This paper tests several such theories in the context of public agencies. Prime ministers, chancellors, and kings alike need to secure the (efficient or inefficient) loyalty of their agencies, such as...

Executive compensation has increased dramatically over the past 15 years, but so has forced CEO turnover. We argue that part of the development of CEO pay can be explained by the adverse consequences that forced turnover implies for a CEO. We ¯nd that for the CEOs of the largest US...

Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This reaction reflects reasonably rational use of information. “Tone surprise” – the residual when negativity in managerial tone is regressed on the firm’s recent economic...

We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying. The results allow us to reject a type-based model. People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either "economic types" (who care...

Extreme-right-wing (ERW) parties are on the rise in many countries. Moreover, there is an alarmingly high cross-country correlation between the election success of ERW parties and immigration. Motivated by this evidence, we explore one potentially important channel through which immigration may...

A principal provides budgets to agents (e.g., divisions of a firm or the principal's children) whose expenditures provide her benefits, either materially or because of altruism. Only agents know their potential to generate benefits. We prove that if the more "productive" agents are also more...

A principal provides budgets to agents (e.g., divisions of a firm or the principal's children) whose expenditures provide her benefits, either materially or because of altruism. Only agents know their potential to generate benefits. We prove that if the more "productive" agents are also more...

type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, accounting for various other factors, industry risk is unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using...</p>

What percentage of its assets should a defined benefit pension plan invest into stocks as its funding ratio varies? We show that the answer to this question depends on the institutional setting and in particular on the extent to which the sponsoring company contributes to the fund as the funding...