When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization' (2011). Volume 80, issue 3, pages 553-573.<P> When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may...</p>

This article explores the determinants of effective leadership in a team of production. We obtain that for leadership to be effective, the leader must be at least as productive as the follower. In the case of a charismatic leader, we obtain that efficiency can be restored with a homogeneous team.

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and active monitoring. This paper reports the results...

We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite...