Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 253
Cover Image
Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: Journal of economic theory 91 (2000) 1, pp. 91-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001466773
Cover Image
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 33 (2004) 1, pp. 115-128
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002506281
Cover Image
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 36 (2008) 3/4, pp. 497-518
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666159
Cover Image
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: Journal of mathematical economics 46 (2010) 5, pp. 937-949
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300183
Cover Image
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 588-600
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009619465
Cover Image
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: International Journal of Game Theory 36 (2008) 3, pp. 497-518
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755744
Cover Image
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498408
Cover Image
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (2010) 5, pp. 937-949
The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870899
Cover Image
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547423
Cover Image
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 588-600
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049870