This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which proves the existence of equilibrium with positive probability of trade for private value auctions

Crowdsourcing platforms typically take a passive approach and let solvers self-select which (if any) of the concurrently running contests they wish to participate into. Thus, firms which set prizes and organize contests on these platforms are competing among themselves (for solver participation...

We consider an ad network's problem of allocating the auction for each individual impression to an optimal subset of advertisers, with the goal of revenue maximization. This is a variant of bipartite matching, except that advertisers may strategize by choosing their bidding profiles and their...

We propose a novel approach to the modelling of second-price Maximum-Value auctions that assumes no belief about others' behavior and no expected profit maximization. This individual decision-making model, naïve Impulse Balance Equilibrium or nIBE, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from...

This paper investigates symmetric equilibria in first- and second-price auctions with multidimensional types. The constructed model mirrors the information structure of actual procurement auctions. We demonstrate by a counterexample that symmetric and continuous type distribution is not a...

This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation, and shows that, when bidders' valuation distribution is concave, there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions. It also investigates how the...