This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth is private … information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which there are two levels of wealth, I derive the … optimal alternative imprisonment sentence is sufficiently high that high-wealth individuals prefer to pay a fine exceeding the …

This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the … misrepresenting one's wealth level, and the optimal audit probability. I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealth … fine for the offense who misrepresent their wealth levels. I also show that the optimal fine for the offense results in …

This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth is private … information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which there are two levels of wealth, I derive the … optimal alternative imprisonment sentence is sufficiently high that high-wealth individuals prefer to pay a fine exceeding the …

This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the … misrepresenting one's wealth level, and the optimal audit probability. I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealth … fine for the offense who misrepresent their wealth levels. I also show that the optimal fine for the offense results in …

This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth cannot be observed by … the enforcement authority. I employ a model in which there are two types of offenders - a low-wealth type and a high-wealth … type. The consequence of the unobservability of wealth depends on whether the enforcement authority would employ fines …