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Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - In: The Rand journal of economics 39 (2008) 2, pp. 434-451

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003740009

Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - 2004

We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and also of his effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in effort and type. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069817

The optimal rewards in contests

Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002690963

An efficient and strategy-proof double-track auction for substitutes and complements

Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu - 2014

We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods … the auction, the auctioneer announces the current prices for all items, bidders respond by reporting their demands at … their market power, this dynamic auction always induces the bidders to bid truthfully as price-takers, yields an efficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403061

The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities

Koska, Onur A.; Onur, Ilke; Stähler, Frank - 2015

-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496103

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Anchored strategic reasoning

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula - 2022

Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191577

Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of ad quality on search revenue

Kim, Dongwoo; Pal, Pallavi - 2023

information' assumption. The ad value is characterized by a tractable analytical solution given observed auction parameters. Using … Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226863

Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of AD quality on search revenue

Kim, Dongwoo; Pal, Pallavi - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014228566

Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impact of Ad quality on search revenue

Kim, Dongwoo; Pal, Pallavi - 2024

nonparametric estimators. Using Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053799