We focus on downstream uses that combine multiple intellectual property rights and examine the effects of introducing an intellectual property clearinghouse that reduces transaction costs associated with licensing. We show that this causes equilibrium royalties to rise in some cases and may harm...

This paper reviews and compares patent pools, intellectual property clearinghouses and copyright collectives as alternative systems for promoting efficient access to licensable intellectual property in a 'market for technology' (Arora et al 2001). These systems aid downstream use of innovations...

We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders for a standard may not occur, despite significant gains for patent holders and users of the standard. Utilizing Maskin's (2003) framework, we show that a grand coalition can be implemented only if the number of patent holders (n) is...

We explore the consequences of the utility requirement on speed of innovation, welfare and public policy. A weak utility requirement means that an intermediate technology with no immediate application or commercial value is patentable. Using a model of two stage innovation with free entry and...

We explore the consequences of the utility requirement on speed of innovation and welfare. A weak utility requirement means that an intermediate technology with no immediate application or commercial value is patentable. Using a model of two stage innovation with free entry and trade secrecy, we...

We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also...

We explore the consequences of the utility requirement for patents on speed of innovation. Basic research output, that has no immediate appli-cation except for as a step to further research, may not be patentable be-cause it does not fulfill the utility requirement of patentability....

We provide an economic analysis of two types of research exemptions: (1) experimentation and research on the patented subject matter, and (2) academic (or non-commercial) research with the patented invention. We find that exemption for research on improving or inventing-around the subject matter...

We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders may not occur, despite significant gains for them and the users. We use the sequential coalition formation framework to show that no coalition may form when the number of patent holders is large, if a firm initiating the coalition can...

We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also...