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We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The...
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This paper analyzes a dynamic lobbying model in which two antagonistic lobbies compete with each other for a prize over two time periods that are linked through status quo bias. The attacker has to decide whether to attempt an attack on the status quo already in the first period or whether to...
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Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model … power. When parties are risk-averse, a self-enforcing peace agreement may not be feasible. The bargaining power of the …
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Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as dynamic games in which parties have no commitment power. In our model … the balance of power. When marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, a self-enforcing peace agreement may not be … feasible. The bargaining power of the potential aggressor increases dramatically if she is able to make probabilistic threats …
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being implemented) and a return to violence. The models also control for various agreement provisions such as power …
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