In this paper, we outline a baseline DSGE model which enables a straightforward analysis of wage bargaining between firms and households/unions in a model with both staggered prices and wages. Relying on empirical evidence, we assume that prices can be changed whenever wages are changed. This...

We show that in micro data, as well as in a search and matching model with endogenous separations and rigid wages, separations and hence employment volatility are non-neutral to wage rigidities of incumbent workers. In contrast to when all wages are flexible, the standard deviation of...

We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and equilibrium payoffs characterized. The transfers between the...

The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment choice and the payoffs in equilibrium are studied. In the model, the firm first selects the workers it wants to hire. The selected workers then decide whether they want to...