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In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetric learning about agents' abilities provides the first principal with an informational advantage and has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002691183
Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational...
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Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a "one-size-fits-all" approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003500325
An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent's type. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such ex ante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his future productivity. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319000
Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a quot;one-size-fits-allquot; approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754082
Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318646
Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318139