We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open...

We show that the relation of second order stochastic dominance, which has found widespread use in models of economic behavior under uncertainty, may be described in terms of conditional expectation. If a distribution G second order stochastically dominates another distribution F, then there are...

An effectivity function assigns to each coalition of individuals in a society a family of subsets of alternatives such that the coalition can force the outcome of society’s choice to be a member of each of the subsets separately. A representation of an effectivity function is a game form with...

In this paper, the reimbursement of spending on medicin is considered as <p> a problem of insurance, where the loss due to illness of the insured is covered <p> totally or partially by an insurance company (which may be the government). <p> The presence of moral hazard (in the form of the individual...</p></p></p>