An important result of Hurwicz [2] states that a performance correspondence assigning Pareto optimal allocations to exchange equilibria, which is Nash implementable, must be the Walras equilibrium correspondence. In the present paper, this result is extended to economies over time with the...

Let Gm,n be the class of strategic games with n players, where each player has m\geq2 pure strategies. We are interested in the structure of the set of correlated equilibria of games in Gm,n when n -\infty. As the number of equilibrium constraints grows slower than the number of pure strategy...

We consider a model of commercial television market, where private broadcasters coexist with a public television broadcaster. Assuming that the public TV station follows a policy of Ramsey pricing whereas the private stations are profit maximizers, we consider the equilibria in this market and...

In a large number of situations, activities in health care have to be measured in terms of outcome and cost. However, the cases where outcome is fully captured by a single measure are rather few, so that one uses some index for outcome, computed by weighing together several outcome measures...

We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic gameform using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set....