Do individuals marry and divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the economic attractiveness of a person's marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of consumer-producer households that is applied to rich data from Malawi. Using revealed preference conditions for a...

We apply the collective consumption model of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) to analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. The model focuses on individual preferences, a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple, and a sharing rule...

We model the interaction between the marriage market and the intrahousehold allocation of resources. We do this within a setting that accounts for both economic gains to marriage (through public consumption) and unobserved non-material match quality, without relying on the transferable utility...

We present a methodology for the structural empirical analysis of house- hold consumption and time use behaviour under marital stability. Our approach is of the revealed preference type and non-parametric, meaning that it does not require a prior functional specification of individual utilities....

To understand the household decision-making process regarding food expenditures for children in poor households in Nairobi, we conduct an experiment with 424 married couples. In the experiment, the spouses (individually and jointly) allocated money between themselves and nutritious meals for one...