I show that ownership by blockholding and board composition is an important determinant of corporate debt maturity structure. Using GMM methodology to control for the potential endogeneity of all regressors, I find a statistically and economically significant negative relation between shortterm...

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Further, controlling for...

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the influence of ownership structure and board independence on bond yield spread in BRIC countries, 2007-2016. The main finding of the study is the presence of significant country-specific effects of ownership structure on the cost of debt, and the...

We investigate whether the separation between ownership and control rights can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of capital-raising costs. Using estimates of the cost of equity capital implied by analyst earnings forecasts and growth rate for a sample of 1,207 firms from...

We investigate the effect of government share ownership on the cost of corporate debt. Government ownership could carry an implicit debt guarantee reducing the chance of default and leading to a lower cost of debt. On the other hand, government ownership could lead to a higher cost of debt if...

This article aims to investigate whether institutional investors aid in lowering the cost of debt using a sample of 311 nonfinancial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) over 2011-2020. All data were obtained from the SETSMART database. Controlling for firm characteristics,...

We examine how banks perceive and price related party transactions (RPTs) into the cost of debt for borrowers affiliated with a business group. For this, we use a unique dataset that brings together information on RPTs, ownership structure, and syndicated loans of Asian firms. Our results show...

Debt ownership by equity-holding managers aligns their incentives more closely with those of creditors, thereby reducing agency costs of debt. We test this hypothesis by examining how terms of bank loans are related to executive pension and deferred compensation, i.e., inside debt held by...

The tax laws of most developed countries are debt biased since firms can deduct interest on debt but not on equity. This bias is known to distort investment decisions. However, less is known about how the debt tax shield affects the ownership of assets when bidders differ financial expertise and...