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Patas, Janusch; Mayer, Jörg H.; Goecken, Matthias; … - In: Das Wirtschaftsstudium : wisu ; Zeitschrift für … 41 (2012) 2, pp. 183-186

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505503

Standards and incentives under moral hazard with limited liability

Reinshagen, Felix - 2012

We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490184

Konzepte einer komprimierten Informationsversorgung für die interne Führung und externe Performance-Kommunikation grosser Publikumsgesellschaften

Reinshagen, Felix - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003882663

Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

Reinshagen, Felix - 2012

We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent’s effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427619