In this paper, we propose a dynamic, game theoretic model of dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment with three main entities: sellers, transporters and receivers. The sellers and transporters are modelled as non-cooperative Cournot-Nash agents. The sellers compete to capture receiver...

We introduce the idea of a European-type congestion call option to value commuting to work along a given path for a given departure time selected by automobile drivers who are modeled as Cournot-Nash non-cooperative agents competing for limited roadway capacity when the alternative of...

In this paper, we show that the differential Cournot-Nash game describing dynamic oligopolistic network competition may be articulated as a differential variational inequality involving both control and state variables. We exploit this formulation to establish necessary conditions, an existence...

This paper recognizes that in many decision environments in which revenue optimization is attempted, an actual demand curve and its parameters are generally unobservable. Herein, we describe the dynamics of demand as a continuous time differential equation based on an evolutionary game theory...

In this paper we consider the infinite dimensional variational inequality (VI) formulation of dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) put forward by Friesz et al. (1993) [A variational inequality formulation of the dynamic network user equilibrium problem. Operations Research 41, 179-191] as well as the...