In public-policy discussions about corporate disclosure, more is typically judged better than less. In particular, better disclosure is seen as a way to reduce the agency problems that plague firms. We show that this view is incomplete. In particular, our theoretical analysis shows that...

An objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both...

This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals. We document a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and low levels of uncompensated care increase...

This paper surveys the economic literature on boards of directors. Although a legal requirement for many organizations, boards are also an endogenously determined governance mechanism for addressing agency problems inherent to many organizations. Formal theory on boards of directors has been...

This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals. We document a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and high administrative costs increase board...

This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals. We find a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and high administrative costs increase board...

The authors identify the primary findings of the empirical literature on boards of directors. Typically, these studies have sought to answer one of the following questions: How are the characteristics of the board related to profitability? How do these characteristics affect boards' observable...

How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations (implicit or...

Introduction: the study of corporate governance / Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach -- Aspects of the economics of organization with application to corporate governance / Benjamin E. Hermalin -- Assessing managerial ability: implications for corporate governance / Benjamin E. Hermalin,...