In the framework of interval games, we show that the Shapley value is the unique solution satisfying efficiency, symmetry and coalitional strategic equivalence.

In bankruptcy problems we characterize the random arrival rule by means of CG-consistency and population monotonicity.

In the presence of independence of undominating alternatives and continuity, we show that the symmetric egalitarian solution is the unique symmetric solution satisfying marginal monotonicity.

The equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) can be expressed as the sum of both "internal dividends" and "external losses" for a given transferable utility (TU) game.

We will introduce the notation of the generalized reduced game to “unify” the representations for maximal subclasses of the classes of essential games (superadditive games and convex games) that are closed under reduction in the sense of Sobolev (1975), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), and Moulin...