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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066076

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070123

Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195601

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of economic theory 102 (2002) 1, pp. 189-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661309

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001411783

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001426812

Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring

Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Journal of economic theory 135 (2007) 1, pp. 382-413

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003546408

When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

Gossner, Olivier; Hörner, Johannes - In: Journal of economic theory 145 (2010) 1, pp. 63-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003946305

How robust is the folk theorem?

Hörner, Johannes; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: The quarterly journal of economics 124 (2009) 4, pp. 1773-1814

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003930508

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