We model competition between risk-neutral principals who hire weakly risk-averse agents to produce a good of variable quality. The agent can increase the likelihood of producing a high-quality good by providing costly effort. We demonstrate that, when the agent is strictly risk-averse, the cost...

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic model of labor supply, occupational sorting, human capital accumulation and discrimination to explain the narrowing gender earnings gap from 1968 to 1993. The paper proves the model is identified and develops a three-step estimation technique....

In this paper, we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers’ skills. We show that informational differences across jobs give rise to experimentation in that workers may be willing to sacrifice current period output in order to take...

This paper explores the estimation of a class of life-cycle discrete choice dynastic models. It provides a new representation of the value function for these class of models. It compare a multistage conditional choice probability (CCP) estimator based on the new value function representation...

This paper is an empirical study of the market for managers, more specifically the effects of agency, human capital, and preferences on their promotion, tenure, turnover and compensation. From a large longitudinal data set compiled from observations on executives and their publicly listed firms,...

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic model of labor supply, occupational sorting, human capital accumulation and discrimination to explain the narrowing gender earnings gap from 1968 to 1993. The paper proves the model is identified and develops a three-step estimation technique....

This paper estimates the impact of parents' time investment in young children, their socioeconomic status and family structure on long-term outcomes of children. We developed and estimated a model of dynastic households in which altruistic individuals choose fertility, labor supply, and time...

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for...