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We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010069
We study the gains from trade in a model with endogenously variable markups. We show that the pro-competitive gains from trade are large if the economy is characterized by (i) extensive misallocation, i.e., large ineciencies associated with markups, and (ii) a weak pattern of cross-country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903400
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskinʼs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043034
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965553
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010044575
This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adopt<I>finite</I> mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games. We provide a condition, top-<I>D</I> inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed...</i></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100420
This paper studies repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity and show that it is necessary for repeated implementation in finite as well as infinite horizon problems....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104359
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin's definition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152860
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009692148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009553189