This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...

This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...

This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...

Conditional value at risk (CVaR) has been widely used as a risk measure in finance. When the confidence level of CVaR is set close to 1, the CVaR risk measure approximates the extreme (worst scenario) risk measure. In this paper, we present a quantitative analysis of the relationship between the...

This paper presents a Nash equilibrium model where the underlying objective functions involve uncertainty and nonsmoothness. The well-known sample average approximation method is applied to solve the problem and the first order equilibrium conditions are characterized in terms of Clarke...