When agents agree to disagree about the expected growth rate of the aggregate endowment process, we study the asset price dynamics under "Keeping up with the Joneses" (KUJ) meaning that each agent maximizes the expected life-time CRRA utility of his relative consumption to the other agent in the...

As the main building blocks of the modern finance theory, homogeneity and rational expectation have faced difficulty in explaining many market anomalies, stylized factors, and market inefficiency in empirical studies. As a result, heterogeneity and bounded rationality have been used as an...

The market selection depends on agent's survival index, which is a function of agent's belief and risk preference. When preferences are identical, the survival index of an agent is a decreasing function of his belief accuracy and therefore agent survives if and only if he has the lowest survival...

When agents have irrational beliefs which are rational on average, it has been shown that the effect of their trades does not cancel out in general and can lead to time variations in market price of risk and volatility. In this paper, we follow the differences-in-opinion approach and show that...

This paper examines the effect of behavioral sentiment in a limit order market when agents are risk averse and arrive in the market with different time horizons. The order submission rules with respect to order type and size are determined by maximizing the expected utility of agents with...

When people agree to disagree, this paper examines the impact of the disagreement among agents on market equilibrium and equity premium. Within the standard mean variance framework, we consider a market of two risky assets, a riskless asset and two (and then a continuum of) agents who have...

When agents agree to disagree about the expected growth rate of the aggregate endowment process, we study the asset price dynamics under “Keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) meaning that each agent maximizes the expected life-time CRRA utility of his relative consumption to the other agent in...