profit-sharing on the wage outcome and the bargaining inefficiencies, like strikes. Our main results are as follows. If the …. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes, which waste industry potential ressources, at …-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm-level vs industry-level), we investigate the effects of adopting …

Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in asimple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium … credible, but neverwhen strike is not credible. In the limit as time between bargaining roundsvanishes only the first paradox …

inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always …

strategic activities include discriminatory discharges, recognition strikes, intransigence in bargaining, and strikes or … organization and regulate industrial relations to promote equity in bargaining between employers and employees and to promote … conflicts with respect to organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcing collective agreements. Elections, the requirement of …

The game-strategic foundation of the Nash bargaining solution by a Rubinstein (1982) alternating-offers game shows that … in wage bargaining models the threat point should be the inside, instead of the outside, option. So far, this insight has … wage bargaining models. The solution to the dynamic bargaining system resulting from the endogeneity of inside options can …

This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data … considerations into account in the bargaining process. …

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that efficiency … stronger than the firm and the productivity enhancing effects of paying higher wages are sufficiently large, then efficiency …

We study an alternating-offer bargaining game with a deadline from which the size of the cake decays. We consider both … strategy profiles that survive notions of iterated dominance and show how it restricts the behaviour of the players. We also … equilibria). Then, we endogenize the choice of the deadline and we find that bargaining game is characterized by a deadline …