In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: 'yes' or 'no'. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They...

This paper is concerned with the asymptotic behavior of some global quantities relating to weighted decision rules when the number of small voters tends to infinity. First, voting is assumed to be motivated by interests, so that the collective decision is "preference aggregation". Here the...

This paper introduces a process of individual adjustment based on private local experiences and observation that allows for the emergence of a global social structure that is the equilibrium to the static follow-the-leader game of Goldbaum (2013). The setting rewards agents for being early...

This paper aims to address the decision-making process of individual and collective behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil. Our analysis will use theoretical models in economics, namely game theory and the tragedy of commons, to simulate individual, firms, and collective behavior in the...

This paper introduces a process of individual adjustment based on private local experiences and observation that allows for the emergence of a global social structure that is the equilibrium to the static follow-the-leader game of Goldbaum (2013). The setting rewards agents for being early...

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...

Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible...

Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible...