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The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency

Mirman, Leonard J.; Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Salgueiro, Egas - In: Economic Theory 19 (2002) 3, pp. 549-570

The dynamics of a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. <p>Compared to...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753321

Dynamic regulation revisited : signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Withers, John A. - 2019

Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's id- iosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024566

Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Withers, John A. - 2019

Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's idiosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024728

Experimentation and Signal Dampening in Agency--The Ratchet Effect Revisited

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Mirman, Leonard J.; Salgueiro, Egas M. - 1999

The dynamics of incentive contracts under asymmetric information have long been an important topic in economics. We address this topic in this paper by considering a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship, in which the true state of the world can take on two possible values and is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202378

Chapter 33 The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies

Hartley, Keith - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 1139-1176). 2007

controversial areas involving arms industries, alternative procurement policies and industrial policy. Arms industries are defined … procurement raises both theory and policy issues. There are principal-agent problems and issues of adverse selection, moral hazard … the role of competition in arms procurement, its extension to military outsourcing and the profitability of non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024396

On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement

Seres, Gyula; Pigoń, Adam - 2021

highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. The market exhibits a screening method that ex post selects eligible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324374

On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement

Pigoń, Adam; Seres, Gyula - 2019

screening and litigation on entry and bidding using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106107

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064218

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

agent’s effort, inducing as much experimentation as possible over an initial period, until making a switch to the worst …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645612

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

experimentation as possible over an initial period, until making a switch to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895676